we would have classical logic for bounded quantification while intuitionistic logic is to be used for unbounded quantification. ([10, p. 23 
])
At the end of [10] he made that idea more precise by suggesting semi-intuitionistic set theories as frameworks for formulating questions of definiteness and studying the definiteness of specific set-theoretic statements. In relation to CH, he conjectured that this statement is not definite in the specific case of a semi-intuitionistic set theory T, in the sense that T does not prove CH ∨ ¬CH. The set-theoretical point of view expressed by T accepts the definiteness of the continuum in its guise as the arithmetical/geometric structure of the real line, but does not allow the powerset operation to be applied to arbitrary sets.
The objective of this paper is to prove Feferman's conjecture. In this sense it is a technical paper. It lays out new evidence for the reader to consider. However, as far as the ongoing discussions of the foundational status of CH are concerned, readers will have to form their own conclusions.
A chief technique applied in this article is realizability over relativized constructible hierarchies combined with forcing. More widely the impression is that CH is not an isolated case in that other statements could be proved to be indefinite relative to semi-intuitionistic set theories in this way. At any rate, it appears that the paper adds a hitherto unexplored tool to the weaponry earmarked for engineering specific realizability models and proving independence results.
An outline of the paper reads as follows: Section 2 introduces formal systems of semi-intuitionistic set theory and in particular the theory T. Section 3 is devoted to the relativized constructible hierarchy L [A] and its properties. In Section 4, L [A] features as a domain of computation which gets utilized in Section 5 as a realizability universe for T. By carefully designing sets of ordinals C and E and employing results from forcing, realizability of T over L [C ] and L[C ∪ E] yields conflicting information that leads to a contradiction, and thus provides a proof of the desired conjecture. §2. Semi-intuitionistic set theory. The study of subsystems of ZF formulated in intuitionistic logic with Bounded Separation was apparently initiated by Pozsgay [21, 22] and then pursued more systematically by Tharp [29] , Friedman [14] and Wolf [30] . These systems are actually semi-intuitionistic as they contain the law of excluded middle for bounded formulae.
Classical Kripke-Platek set theory, KP, is an important theory that accommodates a great deal of set theory. Its transitive models, called admissible sets, have been a major source of interaction between model theory, recursion theory and set theory (cf. [3] ). KP arises from ZF by completely omitting the power set axiom and restricting separation and collection to bounded formulae. Here we are interested in its intuitionistic cousin.
Definition 2.1. Intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory, IKP, is formulated in the usual language of set theory containing ∈ as the only non-logical symbol besides =. Formulae are built from prime formulae a ∈ b and a = b by use of propositional connectives and quantifiers ∀x, ∃x. Quantifiers of the forms ∀x ∈ a, ∃x ∈ a are called bounded. Bounded or Δ 0 -formulae are the formulae wherein all quantifiers are bounded. IKP is based on intuitionistic logic and has the following non-logical axioms: Extensionality, Pair, Union, Infinity (in the specific version that there is a smallest set containing the empty set 0 and closed under the successor operation, x = x ∪ {x}), Bounded Separation
for all bounded formulae ϕ(u), Bounded Collection ∀x ∈ a ∃y (x, y) → ∃z ∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ z (x, y) for all bounded formulae (x, y), and Set Induction
for all formulae (x).
Feferman in [9] proceeded to add several further schemata to the axioms of IKP. The most basic principle that he added follows from the idea that in semi-constructive set theory each set is considered to be a definite totality. As a consequence of Δ 0 separation one obtains a restricted LEM:
Markov's principle in the form (MP) ¬¬∃xϕ → ∃xϕ, for all Δ 0 -formulae ϕ is another principle that is frequently added in this context. Some further principles that are considered in [9] are (BOS) (Bounded Omniscience Scheme) and AC Set (Axiom of Choice).
for all formulae ϕ(x).
for all formulae (x, y), where Fun(f) expresses in the usual set-theoretic form that f is a function, and dom(f) = a expresses that the domain of f is the set a.
Feferman [9, Theorem 6] shows that SCS := IKP + (Δ 0 −LEM) + (MP) + (BOS) + (AC Set ) has the same proof-theoretic strength as KP (and therefore the same as IKP). His proof uses a functional interpretation. The same result can be obtained via a realizability interpretation using codes for Σ 1 partial recursive set functions as realizers along the lines of Tharp's 1971 arcticle [29] .
Remark 2.2. (i) SCS proves the full replacement schema of ZF. Moreover, SCS proves strong collection, i.e., all formulae
where ϕ(x, y) is an arbitrary formula. Strong collection is an axiom schema of Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, CZF (cf. [1, 2] ) and also of Tharp's set theory [29] .
(ii) SCS is a subtheory of Tharp's semi-intuitionistic set theory IZF [29] As it turns out, some of the axioms of SCS are redundant.
Proposition 2.3. IKP + (AC Set ) proves (Δ 0 −LEM) and (BOS).
Proof. First we prove (Δ 0 −LEM), using Diaconescu's old constructions [7] . Let 0 be the empty set, 1 := {0} and A = {0, 1}. Note that (intuitionistically) ∀x, y ∈ A [x = y ∨ x = y] (where x = y abbreviates ¬x = y) since 0 = 1 as 0 ∈ 1 and 0 / ∈ 0. Suppose ϕ is Δ 0 . Define
a and b are sets by Δ 0 separation. Obviously we have ∀z ∈ {a, b} ∃k ∈ A k ∈ z since 0 ∈ a and 1 ∈ b. So we may apply (AC Set ) to obtain a function f with domain
In the first case, we can infer that ϕ. In the second case, we have a = b.
where (x) is an arbitrary formula. Thus,
With the help of (AC Set ) there is a function f with domain a such that
and
In the former case we deduce ∃x ∈ a ¬ (x) from (1), whereas in the latter case we infer that ∀x ∈ a (x).
Definition 2.4. Let T be the theory
where SCS is from Definition 2.1 and 'R is a set' asserts that the reals, R, form a set. Since SCS has classical logic for Δ 0 -formulae it is not necessary to pay much attention to the question of how the reals are actually formalized as is so often the case in intuitionistic contexts. Thus, any of the following equivalent statements could be used to formalize the existence of R as a set:
• The collection of all functions from N to N, N N , is a set.
• The collection of all subsets of N is a set.
Remark 2.5. The proof-theoretic strength of T resides strictly between full classical second order arithmetic and Zermelo set theory. In particular all theorems of classical second order arithmetic are theorems of T.
CH is the statement that every infinite set of reals is either in one-one correspondence with N or with R. More formally, this can be expressed as follows:
where f : y z signifies that f is a surjective function with domain y and co-domain z.
Conjecture 2.6 (Feferman). T does not prove CH ∨ ¬CH.
When one ponders how to prove the conjecture one of the first ideas that comes to mind is that intuitionistic set theories S very often have the disjunction property, i.e., if S ∨ then S or S (cf. [25, 26] ). If this property held for T it would certainly settle the conjecture in the affirmative. However, T being semi-intuitionistic, the disjunction property does not hold for it. The technique of realizability certainly springs to mind when tackling such problems and consequently one would like to show that there is a realizability interpretation of T that has no realizer for CH ∨ ¬CH. There are several essentially different forms of realizability for set theories to choose from (cf. [4, 5, 14, 19, 20, [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 29] ). Moreover, what should the realizers be and how should the realizability universe be defined? §3. The relativized constructible hierarchy. Later we shall look at realizability interpretations in the relativized constructible hierarchy. 
is interesting for the purposes of this paper.
Definition 3.1. Let L ∈ be the language of set theory and L ∈ (P) be its augmentation by a unary predicate symbol P. Let A be a set. Any set X gives rise to a structure X, ∈, A ∩ X for L ∈ (P) with domain X where the elementhood symbol is interpreted by the elementhood relation restricted to X × X and P is interpreted as A ∩ X . Thereby A acts as a unary predicate on X . A subset Y of X is said to be definable in X, ∈, A ∩ X if there is a formula ϕ (x, y 1 , . . . , y r ) of L ∈ (P) with all free variables exhibited and
where, of course, X, ∈, A ∩ X |= ϕ (a, b 1 , . . . , b r ) signifies that ϕ holds in the structure under the variable assignment x → a and y i → b i .
The sets L α [A] are defined by recursion on α as follows:
The next proposition lists some important properties of L α [A] . Bounded quantifiers are of the form ∀x ∈ y and ∃x ∈ y. A bounded or Δ 0 -formula of L ∈ (P) is a formula in which all quantifiers appear bounded. A formula of L ∈ (P) of the form ∃zϕ(z) (∀zϕ(z)) with ϕ bounded is said to be Σ 1 (
) if it is definable (with parameters) on the structure
if it is both Σ [15, 18] .
There is a Σ 1 formula wo(x, y, z) such that ] . In this section we develop the recursion theory of partial Σ
functions, that is functions (not necessarily everywhere defined) whose graphs are Σ a 1 and a 1 , . . . , a n , a n+1 := a 1 , . . . , a n , a n+1 . It is a standard procedure to assign to each formula of L ∈ (P) a Gödel number such that is a hereditarily definable set, for instance by using the pairing function a, b → a, b . There is a formula Sat(v, w) of L ∈ (P) such that for all Δ 0 formulae (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of L ∈ (P), not involving other free variables, the following holds for any limit > and all a = a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ L [A]:
Moreover, Sat is uniformly Δ
for limits > (see [6, II] ). Now let be a limit > . For e, a 1 , . . . , a n 
if e is an ordered pair , c with being a Δ 0 -formula of L ∈ (P), not involving free variables other than x 1 , . . . , x n+2 , such that ( , a 1 , . . . , a n , c, d ) ( 4 ) and ( 
(uniformly for all such ). (ii) For every n-ary partial
n (a 1 , . . . , a n ) b for some limit .
Proof. (i) First note that by Proposition 3.2 the relation
for all limits > . Thus the < L[A] -leastness of d with respect to (4) can be expressed by
which is clearly Σ
there is a Σ 1 -formula ∃x n+3 ϑ 0 (x 1 , . . . , x n+3 ) of L ∈ (P) and a parameter c ∈ L [A] (several parameters can be coded as one) such that n+3 ϑ 0 (a 1 , . . . , a n , c, b, x n+3 ). 
, where a = a 1 , . . . , a n . It will also be assumed that all quantifiers range over L [A] .
Occasionally we shall write A for ∃e ∈ L[A] e A . (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a formula of set theory, with all free variables among the exhibited, and D is a proof of (x 1 , . . . , x n ) in T, then one can effectively construct a hereditarily finite set e D which only depends on D (and not on A) such that for all
Theorem 5.2 (Realizability Theorem). Let R L[A] be the set of real numbers in the sense of L[A]. If
Proof. With little modification, the proof of Tharp's realizability theorem [29] carries over to show this realizability theorem. It can also be gleaned from the proofs of the realizability theorems [27, Theorems 3.7-3.9], using considerable simplifications of the proofs brought about by the fact that there is uniform Σ
L[A]
1 selection function, i.e., there exists a hereditarily finite set e ac such that for all A and nonempty
. In order to show that CH ∨ ¬CH is not deducible in T we intend to employ Theorem 5.2. Aiming at a contradiction, we assume we have a derivation D of CH ∨ ¬CH in T and thus a hereditarily finite set e D such that
holds for all sets A. To refute this, we intend to carefully design a counterexample C . 4 We shall start from a set-theoretic universe V 0 such that
V 0 can be obtained from any universe V such that V |= ZFC + GCH (e.g. L) by forcing with Fn(κ × , 2), where the latter denotes the set of all finite functions with domain ⊂ κ × and range 2 and κ = (ℵ 2 ) V , i.e., κ is ℵ 2 in the sense of V (see [17, VII.5.14]). Now let R V 0 be the reals in the sense of V 0 . We would like to pick a set
. 5 Since V 0 satisfies AC there is an injective function F in V 0 with domain R V 0 whose range is a set of ordinals. Identifying R V 0 with the set {g ∈ V 0 | g : N → N}, let
Then C is a set of ordinals in V 0 and, owing to the uniqueness of the Cantor normal form,
As a result, L[C ] |= CH and therefore
The assumption (6) (6) and (9) entail that
We can now pick a sufficiently large limit ordinal such that
Moreover, from Lemma 4.2(iv) and Proposition 3.2(11) it follows that for every set of ordinals B with B ∩ = ∅ we have
The next step consists in taking a forcing extension V 1 of V 0 which does not pick up new real numbers but satisfies V 1 |= 2 ℵ 0 = ℵ 1 , i.e.,
The latter can be arranged by forcing with
i.e., the set of functions f ∈ V 0 which are countable in V 0 with domain contained in (ℵ 1 ) V 0 and range contained in (ℵ 2 ) V 0 . That (13) holds follows, e.g., from [17, Ch.VII 6.13, 6.14, 6.15, 6.2].
Next we would like to engineer a set E ∈ V 1 of ordinals all of whose members are greater than such that L[C ∪ E] |= CH. Since V 1 is a model of the axiom of choice, there are functions G and H with domains {α | ≤ α < (ℵ 1 )
is a bijection between α and , and for each ∈ dom(H ), H := H ( ) is a bijection between and (ℵ 1 ) V 1 . Let κ and be fixed points of the function → such that κ < and , (ℵ 1 )
where of course κ α and refer to the operation of ordinal exponentiation. Then E 1 ∩ E 2 = ∅. Moreover, owing to the uniqueness of Cantor normal forms (e.g. [28, Theorem 8.4 
(using the parameter κ), and likewise, for each ∈ dom(H ), H is definable from C ∪E in L[C ∪E] (using the parameter ). To elaborate on this, suppose α ∈ dom(G). Then for < α search for the least ordinal such that κ α · (1 + ) + ∈ E. Necessarily, = G α ( ). As a consequence of the above, we have
To see the latter, suppose that x ∈ L[C ∪ E] and x is an infinite set of reals. As 
and x. From (8) and (13), we also conclude that
Utilizing the wellordering < L [C ∪E] and (14), there exists a Σ
partial function g that finds for each non-empty set of reals either a surjection of onto x or a surjection of x onto R L[C ] since being such a mapping f is a Δ 0 property of f in the parameters x, and (12) and (6) it then follows that (b) 0 = 0, contradicting (10). In sum, a contradiction has been inferred from (6) . On account of Theorem 5.2, this implies that CH ∨ ¬CH is not provable in T. §7. Extensions. There are several ways in which the theory T can be strengthened without forfeiting the unprovability of CH ∨ ¬CH. For statements of second order arithmetic, i.e., those expressible in the language of the structure (R; ∈; N; <, +, ·, 0, 1),
T proves ∨ ¬ . This for instance applies if expresses Π . Subsequently one can employ the same proof as in the previous section, starting with a universe V 0 |= ZFC + 2 ℵ 0 = ℵ 2 + . Note that since V 0 and V 1 share the same reals, will also be true in V 1 .
It is also possible to go a bit beyond this level. Let PD be the statement of projective determinacy (see e.g. [16] ). In T one can define a satisfaction relation for the structure in (16) which is Δ 1 in R and actually a set computable from R in the sense of Section 4. As a result one obtains a variant of Theorem 5.2. (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
Proof. We only need to concern ourselves with PD. First note that the satisfaction predicate for the structure of the reals is computable from the parameter R L [A] . Moreover, if a set is realizably a projective set it is indeed a projective set (and vice versa) and thus a winning strategy (which is a real) exists and thus can be searched for (and found) in the computable universe L [A] . Whence PD is realizable. Proof. (i) PD is just the statement that Π 1 n -determinacy holds for all n. Since in T one has excluded middle for the satisfaction predicate pertaining to the structure (16) and ∀n is a bounded quantifier, (i) follows.
(ii) We just sketch a proof. To commence one starts with a universe V 0 |= ZFC + PD + 2 ℵ 0 = ℵ 2 . Then one carries out the same construction as in Section 6. As V 0 and V 1 have the same reals they share the same projective sets of reals, and hence PD also holds in V 1 .
